| Region | N | Mean L | Mean HCI | r (L×HCI) | % Free | % Cap. Autocracy | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Europe | 23 | 82 | 91 | 0.785 | 96% | 4% | Mixed |
| Americas | 12 | 58 | 78 | 0.642 | 42% | 25% | Declining |
| Asia-Pacific | 15 | 47 | 76 | 0.534 | 27% | 40% | Mixed |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 15 | 38 | 62 | 0.512 | 13% | 20% | Declining |
| South Asia | 8 | 42 | 65 | 0.471 | 13% | 25% | Declining |
| MENA | 10 | 22 | 83 | 0.298 | 0% | 80% | Stagnant |
| Eurasia | 8 | 14 | 75 | 0.268 | 0% | 100% | Declining |
Europe remains the world's freest and most capable region, with the strongest correlation between liberty, and development (r=0.785). Twenty-two of 23 European countries qualify as "Free and Capable." But the aggregate conceals a growing fracture between a stable northwest and a volatile southeast.
The Tusk coalition reversed 8 years of PiS-led erosion. Voter turnout of 74.4% was the highest in Polish democratic history. Remaining challenge: President Nawrocki creates institutional friction. The recovery demonstrates that reversal IS possible before the event horizon.
Orbán's NER system has been in place for 15 years. 90% of media controlled. EU funds used to sustain patronage networks. Hungary's gravitational pull affects neighbours: Slovakia, Serbia, and parts of the western Balkans are influenced by the "illiberal democracy" model.
RN nnormalisation, Yellow Vest disruptions, and executive centralisation under Macron create institutional strain. France's trajectory echoes the US 10 years earlier — declining slowly from a high base. The question is whether the Fifth Republic's structural safeguards hold.
The Western Hemisphere's aggregate decline is driven substantially by the United States. Excluding the US, the region shows a mixed picture: strong performers (Costa Rica, Uruguay, Chile, Canada) offset by entrenched autocracies (Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua) and eroding democracies (Mexico, Brazil).
The dataset's most dramatic case. From L=94 (2015) to L=48 (PTI, 2025). V-Dem reclassification as "electoral autocracy" (Sep 2025). Fastest-declining consolidated democracy on record. Credible range: L=48–84. Even at most generous estimates, decline velocity is unprecedented.
Liberty fell 64 points from peak. HCI held initially, then began declining. Now firmly in the tyranny well. Maduro regime survived 2019 challenge when military chose repression. Capital flight preceded the final institutional collapse by approximately 4 years.
Chile navigated a constitutional crisis (2019-2022) and emerged with democracy intact. Two constitutional referenda, both resolved peacefully. Demonstrates that institutional stress tests can strengthen rather than weaken democratic norms when institutions hold.
Asia-Pacific contains the world's widest political divergence: from Japan (L=96) and Taiwan (L=92) to North Korea (L=2) and Myanmar (L=8). The region is home to the most successful autocratic mmoderniser (China) and the world's fastest-growing democracy (Taiwan). It is also where the capability-freedom decoupling is most dramatic.
Taiwan's trajectory is the mmodernisation theory success story: autocratic mmodernisation under KMT, democratic transition in 1987, steady deepening since. Now amongst the world's freest societies. The external threat from China paradoxically strengthens democratic identity.
The world's largest democracy is eroding under cover of electoral legitimacy. V-Dem downgrade to "electoral autocracy" (2017). Press freedom, minority rights, and judicial independence all deteriorating. Yet economic growth continues, masking institutional damage.
Maximum decoupling. HCI rose 67 points, Liberty gained 1. The world's most successful proof that autocratic mmodernisation can work at scale. But: debt/GDP 300%+, property sector declining, youth unemployment rising. The model may be approaching structural limits.
Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest mean HCI of any region (62) and modest liberty scores (mean 38). The region's challenge is that both capability and freedom are below global averages. Democratic gains from the 1990s Third Wave have partially reversed, with military coups returning in the Sahel.
Post-Jammeh transition (2017) shows that even deeply autocratic states can begin recovery. Progress is slow and fragile. The Gambia represents the hard work of democratic reconstruction from near-zero.
Africa's largest economy and most populous nation is in slow decline. Security challenges (Boko Haram, banditry), corruption, and electoral irregularities erode democratic credibility. The combination of low capability and declining liberty creates a dual vulnerability.
South Asia's democratic trajectory is dominated by India (62% of regional population). Sri Lanka's recovery from crisis, Bangladesh's instability, and Pakistan's military-civilian oscillation all contribute to a region where democracy exists but is under sustained pressure. The correlation between liberty and capability (r=0.471) is weak, suggesting structural barriers to the development-freedom nexus.
MENA is the region of maximum decoupling. Mean HCI of 83 paired with mean Liberty of 22 creates a gap of +61 points — the largest anywhere. The Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait) have built world-class infrastructure, healthcare, and education systems without any meaningful political opening. The correlation between liberty and capability (r=0.298) is the weakest in the dataset. Zero countries qualify as Free.
The most extreme decoupling in the dataset. A country where citizens have access to world-class healthcare, excellent infrastructure, and high income — with near-zero political freedom. MBS's Vision 2030 invests heavily in capability while tightening political control. The Saudi model is the ultimate test case for whether capability can substitute for liberty indefinitely.
Israel's judicial overhaul (2023-24) and subsequent war provided cover for accelerating institutional erosion. 396 anti-democratic bills introduced during wartime. The trajectory parallels Hungary 2010-2015: incremental capture under cover of democratic legitimacy. Once the freest state in MENA; now its trajectory is the most concerning.
Eurasia is the world's least free region and the one where the capability-freedom decoupling is most complete. Every country in the region qualifies as a Capable Autocracy. The correlation between liberty and capability (r=0.268) is the weakest anywhere — meaning that capability has essentially zero relationship to political freedom here. This is the endpoint of the decoupling process.
Russia sits deep in the tyranny well. Under Putin, institutional capture is complete (Stage 8). The Ukraine war has accelerated repression domestically while projecting the authoritarian model externally. Russia is both a data point and an exporter — its playbook (NGO suppression, media capture, foreign agent laws) has been adopted across the post-Soviet space and beyond.
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan form a block of remarkably stable autocracies. Resource wealth (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan) funds patronage. Russian and Chinese security guarantees reduce external pressure for reform. These states have been in the tyranny well for decades with no movement towards the surface.
| Metric | Europe | Americas | Asia-Pac | SSA | South Asia | MENA | Eurasia |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mean Liberty | 82 | 58 | 47 | 38 | 42 | 22 | 14 |
| Mean HCI | 91 | 78 | 76 | 62 | 65 | 83 | 75 |
| L×HCI Gap | +9 | +20 | +29 | +24 | +23 | +61 | +61 |
| Correlation (r) | 0.785 | 0.642 | 0.534 | 0.512 | 0.471 | 0.298 | 0.268 |
| % Declining | 35% | 58% | 60% | 80% | 75% | 40% | 75% |
| % Free | 96% | 42% | 27% | 13% | 13% | 0% | 0% |