Democratic Plateau
82%
stay in basin (10yr)
Hybrid Trap
67%
stay in basin (10yr)
Tyranny Well
91%
stay in basin (10yr)
⚠️ CLASSIFICATION NOTE: Zone velocities use ending-zone assignment (countries classified by period-end score). Starting-zone assignment yields materially different results (e.g., Tyranny Basin: +0.72/yr starting-zone vs −0.64/yr ending-zone). This sensitivity means zone velocity claims should be interpreted with caution. The "gravitational pull" narrative depends on the classification method chosen.
🇳🇴🇩🇪🇨🇦🇺🇸-18/yr🇭🇺🇷🇺🇨🇳🇰🇵DEMOCRATICPlateauHYBRID TRAPShallow WellTYRANNYDeepest WellRidgeline 1CRITICAL INSTABILITYL 52-55 · Critical Instability ZoneRidgeline 2L 100L 50L 0
The Physics: Imagine a marble on this curved surface with three wells. In the democratic plateau (left), the marble sits elevated but fenced by institutional barriers—it takes sustained erosion to push it over the ridgeline. The hybrid trap (center) is a shallow but genuine attractor—countries like Hungary and the US get caught here, neither fully democratic nor fully authoritarian. The tyranny well (right) is the deepest—once a marble rolls in, escape requires extraordinary force. The US marble is currently caught in the hybrid trap, with momentum carrying it toward the tyranny well.
Democratic Plateau
L 70-100
82%
10yr retention
Hybrid Trap
L 20-69
67%
genuine attractor
Tyranny Slope
L 10-19
78%
toward basin
Tyranny Well
L 0-9
98%
nearly absorbing
THE US POSITION: CAUGHT IN THE HYBRID TRAP
At Score 48 (Feb 2026), the United States is lodged in the hybrid trap—the shallow third attractor basin (L≈57) that the previously theorized bistable (now tristable) model missed entirely. The marble has crossed the critical instability zone and is decelerating at -18 pts/year (2yr window; 10yr: -4.2/yr). The hybrid trap may temporarily slow the descent, but without intervention (elite defection, economic shock), momentum carries it toward the tyranny well floor by 2028-2030.
ENGAGEMENT WITH REGIME TRANSITION LITERATURE

Svolik (2012), The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Svolik identifies two fundamental problems that authoritarian rulers must solve to survive: the problem of authoritarian power-sharing (managing threats from insiders within the ruling coalition) and the problem of authoritarian control (preventing mass mobilization from below). These two problems map directly onto the stability mechanisms that give the tyranny well its extraordinary depth in the basin model. The 98% ten-year retention of Stage 8 (Totalitarian, L=0–9) and 91% retention of the tyranny basin overall reflect the successful resolution of both Svolik problems: surveillance and atomization solve the control problem, while patronage networks and coup-proofing solve the power-sharing problem. The stability wells framework extends Svolik's analysis by revealing that these mechanisms create not merely regime persistence but a gravitational attractor—the tyranny well is the deepest basin precisely because the solutions to Svolik's two problems are mutually reinforcing. Fear prevents coordination (solving control), while the absence of coordination makes power-sharing among elites the only viable political strategy (solving power-sharing). This self-reinforcing loop is what makes the well deep: each increment of repression increases the cost of opposition, which further stabilizes the regime, which enables further repression. The formal model captures this as a high gravitational constant (k≈0.15), meaning that deviations from the tyranny equilibrium are rapidly corrected. Svolik's framework explains why k is so high in this basin; the stability wells model shows how high it is and what escape requires.

Levitsky & Way (2010), Competitive Authoritarianism. The hybrid trap—the shallow third basin at L≈47 with 67% ten-year retention—is the feature of the stability wells model that most directly validates and extends Levitsky and Way's scholarship. Before their work, the dominant paradigm (reflected in both Polity and the earlier "transition paradigm" critiqued by Carothers, 2002) treated hybrid regimes as inherently transitional—way stations on a path toward either democracy or autocracy. Levitsky and Way demonstrated that competitive authoritarian regimes could persist for decades, featuring real but unfair elections, constrained but not eliminated opposition, and rule by law rather than rule of law. The stability wells model confirms this empirically: the hybrid trap is a genuine attractor basin, not a transitional slope. The GMM identifies a distinct cluster at μ=25.0 (and the broader hybrid zone at L≈20–70), and the retention rate of 67% over ten years shows that countries entering this zone tend to stay. However, the model also reveals what Levitsky and Way's qualitative framework left ambiguous: the hybrid trap is the shallowest of the three basins (k≈0.05 vs. k≈0.10 for democracy and k≈0.15 for tyranny). This means that while it is a genuine attractor, it is less stable than either endpoint—countries in the hybrid trap are more susceptible to shocks, more likely to transition, and more volatile in their trajectories. The implication is that Levitsky and Way were right that competitive authoritarianism is a stable regime type, but the stability wells model adds a crucial qualification: it is the least stable of the three equilibria, and its long-term survival depends on the absence of large shocks more than on its own structural resilience.