⚠️ METHODOLOGY NOTE — PTI SCORE DIVERGENCE
The US score of L=48 and velocity of -18/yr reflect the author's PTI (Governance Topology Index), a real-time institutional assessment incorporating executive action pace through early 2026. Published indices score the US higher: Freedom House 83/100 (2024 report), V-Dem LDI ~0.65-0.72 (~65-72 scaled). The divergence reflects (a) the PTI's faster update cycle, (b) weighting toward institutional constraint erosion, and (c) incorporation of events post-dating published index coverage. All comparative trajectory claims should be evaluated under both the author's PTI and established indices. See Sensitivity Analysis below.
NOTE — ZONE VELOCITY CLASSIFICATION SENSITIVITY
Zone velocities are calculated using ending-zone assignment (countries classified by where they end each period). Starting-zone assignment yields different results (e.g., Tyranny Basin: +0.72/yr under starting-zone vs -0.64/yr under ending-zone). This classification sensitivity means zone velocity claims should be interpreted with caution. Both methods are reported in the full methodology.
United States (2015-2026)
Hungary (2010-2025)
Turkey (2013-2025)
Venezuela (1998-2025)
10080555240200Liberty ScoreYear 0+5+10+15+20+25+30Years from onset of declineCRITICAL INSTABILITYZONE (L 52-55)🇻🇪 L=8🇹🇷 L=18🇭🇺 L=63🇺🇸 L=48-36 ptsin 2 yrs2015201319982010
CountryPeak ScoreCurrent ScoreDecline PeriodVelocityPrimary Mechanism
🇺🇸United States
94 (2010)48 (2026)11 years
but -36 in last 2
-18/yr
(2023-25)
Executive capture via electoral win + Elite compliance + Judicial immunity cover
🇭🇺Hungary
84 (2010)63 (2025)15 years-3/yr"Salami tactics"—incremental legal/constitutional manipulation. Media capture. EU membership constraints limit speed.
🇹🇷Turkey
55 (2013)18 (2025)12 years-5/yrGülen purge + Failed coup (2016) enabled emergency powers → Presidential system → Total capture
🇻🇪Venezuela
72 (1980)8 (2025)27 years-3/yrConstitutional rewrite → Petro-state patronage → Media nationalization → Opposition ban
THE US ANOMALY
The US trajectory is unprecedented. Hungary took 15 years to drop 21 points. Turkey took 12 years to drop 37 points. Venezuela took 27 years to drop 64 points. The US dropped 36 points in 2 years—a collapse 6× faster than any comparable case. This velocity suggests not gradual erosion but institutional capitulation: when democratic antibodies fail to activate, the system has no internal resistance. The US is experiencing what happens when a consolidated democracy's elite decides not to fight.
Governance Topology · Comparison 9B of 10

Democratic Resilience: Cases of Recovery

The decline cases above tell only half the story. These four cases show democracies that approached or entered the hybrid basin — and escaped. They are the counter-narrative: proof that the topology allows recovery, not just collapse.

SELECTION BALANCE NOTE
The preceding section showed only declining trajectories (Hungary, Turkey, Venezuela), creating an impression that democratic erosion is unidirectional. In fact, the transition matrix shows that 9.2% of "Partly Free" observations transition upward to "Free" in any given period, and the survival analysis confirms that the hybrid zone (S5-S6) is genuinely unstable — countries leave it in both directions. The cases below represent the upward exits.
Poland (2015-2025)
South Korea (2010-2025)
Brazil (2015-2025)
Moldova (2009-2025)
RESILIENCE TRAJECTORIES — LIBERTY SCORE OVER TIMEHYBRID ZONEDEMOCRACY BASIN10080555240200Liberty Score2008201120142017202020232025YearCRITICALINSTABILITYL 52-55Poland L=82PiS era2023 electionS. Korea L=83Park impeachedBrazil L=72Bolsonaro losesJan 8 failsMoldova L=55Hybrid zoneEU path anchoringUS (L=48)
CountryNadir ScoreRecovery ScoreRecovery PeriodRecovery TriggerBasin Model Interpretation
🇵🇱Poland
76 (2019)82 (2025)6 years
+6 pts recovery
2023 parliamentary elections: PiS lost majority after 8 years of judicial erosion, media capture attempts.Never left the democracy basin. Score stayed above 70 throughout PiS era. The basin's gravitational pull kept institutions sufficiently intact that electoral self-correction remained possible.
🇰🇷South Korea
82 (2020)83 (2025)Constitutional
self-correction
2017: Park Geun-hye impeached through constitutional process (Constitutional Court unanimous). Massive peaceful protests.Democracy basin's immune response. Constitutional mechanisms activated precisely as designed. The impeachment process — from National Assembly vote to Court ruling — demonstrated that S1-level democracies possess institutional antibodies that function even under stress.
🇧🇷Brazil
62 (2022)72 (2025)3 years
+10 pts recovery
2022 election: Bolsonaro lost. Jan 8, 2023 insurrection attempt failed. Military stayed loyal to constitutional order. Supreme Court prosecuted participants.Escape from the hybrid boundary. Brazil dipped to L=62, approaching the hybrid zone (below 55). The January 8 crisis tested whether institutional resilience would hold. Military neutrality and judicial independence proved decisive — the country bounced back above the Critical Instability Zone.
🇲🇩Moldova
48 (2009)55 (2025)16 years
+7 pts, still climbing
Pro-EU reform coalition. 2020: Maia Sandu elected. EU candidate status 2022. Gradual institutional strengthening against Russian pressure.Slow escape from the hybrid basin. Moldova was deep in the hybrid zone (L=48) and is gradually climbing toward the democracy basin. The EU accession framework provides an external anchor that increases escape velocity. This case demonstrates that hybrid-zone escape is possible but slow — consistent with the survival analysis showing median hybrid-zone duration of 9-10 years.
THE RESILIENCE PATTERN
These four cases reveal the conditions for democratic recovery: (1) The score never fell too far. Poland and South Korea stayed in the democracy basin (L>70) throughout their crises. Brazil touched L=62 but never crossed below 52-55. Moldova is the exception — it started in the hybrid zone and is climbing out, which is much harder. (2) Electoral mechanisms remained functional. In all four cases, the critical institution was free and fair elections. When citizens could vote incumbents out, they did. (3) At least one institutional pillar held. In South Korea, the Constitutional Court. In Brazil, the military and Supreme Court. In Poland, the EU framework and judiciary. In Moldova, the EU accession anchor. The basin model predicts this: recovery rates drop sharply below the Critical Instability Zone (L=52-55). Below L=52-55, only 3.0% of countries recover (95% CI: 0.7-6.0%). The US at L=48 has already crossed it.
WHY THIS MATTERS FOR THE US CASE
The resilience cases offer both hope and a stark warning. Hope: democratic self-correction is empirically possible — it happened in Poland, South Korea, Brazil, and (slowly) Moldova. Warning: every successful recovery case shared one feature the US currently lacks — the country's liberty score remained above or near the Critical Instability Zone (L~52-55). The US at L=48 is in the hybrid zone, below the ridgeline, in territory where the transition matrix shows only 9.2% of observations transition upward per period. The survival analysis shows 5-year retention in the hybrid zone (S6, L=35-49) is 69.1% — meaning there is a 30.9% chance of exiting within 5 years, but exits go in both directions. Recovery from L=48 would require the kind of institutional revival that Moldova demonstrates — possible, but slow, effortful, and requiring external anchoring.