The Capable Autocracies: Rich States, Captive Peoples
The most dangerous quadrant in global politics is not the poorest or the weakest. It is the upper-left: states with high human capability but low liberty. These "capable autocracies" — China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the UAE — have the resources to sustain repression, the institutions to resist reform, and the wealth to project authoritarian influence globally.
28
Capable autocracies
3.6B
People in that quadrant
81.7
Largest gap (Saudi)
35
Free & Capable
Capable Autocracy (HCI ≥ 70, L < 55)
High human development, low liberty — the "gilded cage". Most dangerous: they can sustain repression indefinitely.
Saudi Arabia (gap 82) · Belarus (81) · China (81) · Cuba (81) · Russia (77) · Vietnam (75) · Iran (75) · UAE (70) · Turkey (69) · Thailand (65) · Singapore (45) · United States (43)
Free & Capable (HCI ≥ 70, L ≥ 55)
The democratic ideal — high development, high freedom. The global model, but shrinking.
Norway · Finland · NZ · Denmark · Switzerland · Netherlands · Sweden · Canada · Australia · Taiwan · Germany · Uruguay · Portugal · Japan · South Korea · France · UK · Chile · Brazil
Neither (HCI < 70, L < 55)
Low capability, low freedom — the "double trap". Hardest to escape.
Afghanistan (51/3) · Somalia (49/8) · DRC (51/15) · Mali (54/8) · Haiti (56/8) · Sudan (59/3) · Ethiopia (58/18) · Pakistan (65/25) · Nigeria (56/38)
Free but Struggling (HCI < 70, L ≥ 55)
Democratic but underdeveloped — fragile gains, vulnerable to backsliding.
Senegal (66/60) · Ghana (73/68) · Botswana (75/71) · India (72/62) · South Africa (76/62)
The US has crossed into the "Capable Autocracy" quadrant. With an HCI of 90.8 but a Liberty score of just 48, the United States now sits alongside Singapore, Serbia, and Mexico in the upper-left — states whose institutional capacity far exceeds their democratic performance. The gap of 42.8 points means the US has the infrastructure of a leading democracy but the political freedom of a partly-free state.
METHODOLOGY NOTE: The PTI score of L≈48 reflects the author's real-time institutional assessment incorporating executive action pace through early 2026. Published indices score the US higher: Freedom House 83/100 (2024 report), V-Dem LDI ≈0.65–0.72 (scaled: ~65–72). The divergence reflects the PTI's faster update cycle, weighting toward institutional constraint erosion, and incorporation of events post-dating published index coverage. All claims should be evaluated under both the author's PTI and established indices.